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Hack Proofing Your Network-2
Chapter 2 • The Laws of Security
One of the shortcuts that security researchers use in discovering vulnerabilities is
a mental list of observable behaviors that tells them something about the security
of the system they are examining. If they can observe a particular behavior, it is a
good indication that the system has a trait that they would consider to be insecure,
even before they have a chance to perform detailed tests.
We call our list the Laws of Security.These laws are guidelines that you can use
to keep an eye out for security problems while reviewing or designing a system.
The system in this case might be a single software program, or it could be an
entire network of computers, including firewalls, filtering gateways, and virus
scanners.Whether defending or attacking such a system, it is important to understand
where the weak points are.
The Laws of Security will identify the weak points and allow you to focus
your research on the most easily attackable areas.This chapter concerns itself with
familiarizing you with these laws. For the most part, the rest of the book is concerned
with providing detailed methods for exploiting the weaknesses that the
If you are already experienced in information security, you could skip this
chapter. However, we recommend that you at least skim the list of laws to make
sure that you know them all, and decide if you know how to spot them and
whether you agree with them.
Knowing the Laws of Security
As we begin to work with the laws of security, we’ll start with a look at the laws
that we have worked with and will discuss during the course of the book.We’ll
discuss their implications and how to use them to discover weakness and
exploitable problems.The laws of security in our list include:
Client-side security doesn’t work.
You cannot securely exchange encryption keys without a shared piece of
Malicious code cannot be 100 percent protected against.
Any malicious code can be completely morphed to bypass signature
Firewalls cannot protect you 100 percent from attack.
Any intrusion detection system (IDS) can be evaded.
Secret cryptographic algorithms are not secure.
If a key isn’t required, you do not have encryption—you have encoding.
Passwords cannot be securely stored on the client unless there is another
password to protect them.
In order for a system to begin to be considered secure, it must undergo
an independent security audit.
Security through obscurity does not work.
There are a number of different ways to look at security laws. In this chapter,
we’ve decided to focus on theory, or laws that are a bit closer to a mathematical
rule. (At least, as close as we can get to that type of rule. Subjects as complex as
these don’t lend themselves to formal proofs.) There’s another way to build a list
of laws: we could make a list of not what is possible, but what is practical. Naturally,
there would be some overlap—if it’s not possible, it’s also not practical. Scott
Culp,Microsoft’s Security Response Center Manager, produced a top-ten list of
laws from the point of view of his job and his customers. He calls these “The Ten
Immutable Laws of Security.”They are:
Law #1: If a bad guy can persuade you to run his program on your
computer, it’s not your computer anymore.
Law #2: If a bad guy can alter the operating system on your computer,
it’s not your computer anymore.
Law #3: If a bad guy has unrestricted physical access to your computer,
it’s not your computer anymore.
Law #4: If you allow a bad guy to upload programs to your Web site, it’s
not your Web site any more.
Law #5:Weak passwords trump strong security.
Law #6: A machine is only as secure as the administrator is trustworthy.
Law #7: Encrypted data is only as secure as the decryption key.
Law #8: An out-of-date virus scanner is only marginally better than no
virus scanner at all.
Law #9: Absolute anonymity isn’t practical, in real life or on the Web.
Law #10:Technology is not a panacea.
The Laws of Security • Chapter 2 13
14 Chapter 2 • The Laws of Security
The full list (with explanations for what each rule means) can be found at
http://www.microsoft.com/technet/col...mlaws.asp.This list is presented
to illustrate another way of looking at the topic, from a defender’s point of
view. For the most part, you will find that these laws are the other side of the
coin for the ones we will explore.
Before we can work with the laws to discover potential problems, we need to
have a working definition of what the laws are. In the following sections, we’ll
look at the laws and what they mean to us in our efforts to secure our networks
Client-Side Security Doesn’t Work
In the first of our laws, we need to define a couple of concepts in regard to security.
What, exactly, are we talking about when we begin to discuss “client-side?” If
we were in a network (client-server) environment, we would define the client as
the machine initiating a request for service and connection, and the server as the
machine waiting for the request for service or connection or the machine able to
provide the service.The term “client-side” in the network is used to refer to the
computer that represents the client end, that over which the user (or the attacker)
has control.The difference in usage in our law is that we call it client-side even if
no network or server is involved.Thus, we refer to “client-side” security even
when we’re talking about just one computer with a piece of software on a floppy
disk.The main distinction in this definition is the idea that users (or attackers)
have control over their own computers and can do what they like with them.
Now that we have defined what “client-side” is, what is “client-side security?”
Client-side security is some sort of security mechanism that is being
enforced solely on the client.This may be the case even when a server is involved,
as in a traditional client-server arrangement. Alternately, it may be a piece of software
running on your computer that tries to prevent you from doing something
The basic problem with client-side security is that the person sitting physically in front of
the client has absolute control over it. Scott Culp’s Law #3 illustrates this in a more
simplistic fashion: If a bad guy has unrestricted physical access to your computer, it’s not
your computer anymore. The subtleties of this may take some contemplation to fully
grasp.You cannot design a client-side security mechanism that users cannot eventually
defeat, should they choose to do so. At best, you can make it challenging or
difficult to defeat the mechanism.The problem is that because most software and
hardware is mass-produced, one dedicated person who figures it out can generally
The Laws of Security • Chapter 2 15
tell everyone else in the world, and often will do so. Consider a software package
that tries to limit its use in some way.What tools does an attacker have at his or
her disposal? He or she can make use of debuggers, disassemblers, hex editors,
operating system modification, and monitoring systems, not to mention unlimited
copies of the software.
What if the software detects that it has been modified? Remove the portion
that detects modification.What if the software hides information somewhere on
the computer? The monitoring mechanisms will ferret that out immediately. Is
there such a thing as tamper-proof hardware? No. If an attacker can spend unlimited
time and resources attacking your hardware package, any tamper proofing
will eventually give way.This is especially true of mass-produced items.We can,
therefore, generally say that client-side security doesn’t work.
This law is utilized in Chapters 5 and 14.
You Cannot Securely Exchange
Encryption Keys without a
Shared Piece of Information
Although this law may seem obvious if you have worked with encryption, it presents
a unique challenge in the protection of our identities, data, and information
exchange procedures.There is a basic problem with trying to set up encrypted
communications: exchanging session keys securely.These keys are exchanged
between the client and server machines prior to the exchange of data, and are
essential to the process. (See Chapter 6 for more information.)
To illustrate this, let’s look at setting up an encrypted connection across the
Internet.Your computer is running the nifty new CryptoX product, and so is the
computer you’re supposed to connect to.You have the IP address of the other
computer.You type it in and hit Connect.The software informs you that it has
connected, exchanged keys, and now you’re communicating securely using 1024-
bit encryption. Should you trust it? Unless there has been some significant crypto
infrastructure set up behind it (and we’ll explain what that means later in this
16 Chapter 2 • The Laws of Security
chapter), you shouldn’t. It’s not impossible, and not necessarily even difficult, to
hijack IP connections. (See Chapter 11.)
The problem here is how do you know what computer you exchanged keys
with? It might have been the computer you wanted. It might have been an
attacker who was waiting for you to make the attempt, and who pretended to be
the IP address you were trying to reach.The only way you could tell for certain
would be if both computers had a piece of information that could be used to
verify the identity of the other end. How do we accomplish this? A couple of
methods come to mind. First, we could use the public keys available through certification
authorities that are made available by Web browser providers. Second,
we could use Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) authentication, or a shared secret key.
All of these, of course, are shared pieces of information required to verify the
sender of the information.
This boils down to a question of key management, and we’ll examine some
questions about the process. How do the keys get to where they are needed?
Does the key distribution path provide a path for an attacker waiting to launch a
man-in-the-middle (MITM) attack? How much would that cost in terms of
resources in relation to what the information is worth? Is a trusted person
helping with the key exchange? Can the trusted person be attacked? What
methods are used to exchange the keys, and are they vulnerable?
Let’s look at a couple of ways that keys are distributed and exchanged.When
encryption keys are exchanged, some bit of information is required to make sure
they are being exchanged with the right party and not falling victim to a MITM
attack. Providing proof of this is difficult, since it’s tantamount to proving the null
hypothesis, meaning in this case that we’d probably have to show every possible
key exchange protocol that could ever be invented, and then prove that they are
all individually vulnerable to MITM attacks.
As with many attacks, it may be most effective to rely on the fact that people
don’t typically follow good security advice, or the fact that the encryption end
points are usually weaker than the encryption itself.
Let’s look at a bit of documentation on how to exchange public keys to give
us a view of one way that the key exchanges are handled: www.cisco.com/
This is a document from Cisco Systems, Inc. that describes, among other
things, how to exchange Digital Signature Standard (DSS) keys. DSS is a
public/private key standard that Cisco uses for peer router authentication.
Public/private key crypto is usually considered too slow for real-time encryption,
The Laws of Security • Chapter 2 17
so it’s used to exchange symmetric session keys (such as DES or 3DES keys).
DES is the Data Encryption Standard, the U.S. government standard encryption
algorithm, adopted in the 1970s. 3DES is a stronger version of it that links
together three separate DES operations, for double or triple strength, depending
on how it’s done. In order for all of this to work, each router has to have the
right public key for the other router. If a MITM attack is taking place and the
attacker is able to fool each router into accepting one of his public keys instead,
then he knows all the session keys and can monitor any of the traffic.
Cisco recognizes this need, and goes so far as to say that you “must verbally
verify” the public keys.Their document outlines a scenario in which there are
two router administrators, each with a secure link to the router (perhaps a terminal
physically attached to the console), who are on the phone with each other.
During the process of key exchange, they are to read the key they’ve received to
the other admin.The security in this scenario comes from the assumptions that
the two administrators recognize each other’s voices, and that it’s very difficult to
fake someone else’s voice.
If the administrators know each other well, and each can ask questions the
other can answer, and they’re both logged on to the consoles of the router, and
no one has compromised the routers, then this is secure, unless there is a flaw in
We’re not going to attempt to teach you how to mimic someone else’s voice,
nor are we going to cover taking over phone company switches to reroute calls
for administrators who don’t know each other. Rather, we’ll attack the assumption
that there are two administrators and that a secure configuration mechanism
One would suspect that, contrary to Cisco’s documentation, most Cisco router
key exchanges are done by one administrator using two Telnet windows. If this is
the case and the attacker is able to play man-in-the-middle and hijack the Telnet
windows and key exchange, then he can subvert the encrypted communications.
Finally, let’s cover the endpoints. Security is no stronger than the weakest
links. If the routers in our example can be broken into and the private keys
recovered, then none of the MITM attacking is necessary. At present, it appears
that Cisco does a decent job of protecting the private keys; they cannot be
viewed normally by even legitimate administrators.They are, however, stored in
memory. Someone who wanted to physically disassemble the router and use a
circuit probe of some sort could easily recover the private key. Also, while there
hasn’t been any public research into buffer overflows and the like in Cisco’s IOS,
18 Chapter 2 • The Laws of Security
I’m sure there will be someday. A couple of past attacks have certainly indicated
that such buffer overflows exist.
Another way to handle the exchange is through the use of SSL and your
browser. In the normal exchange of information, if you weren’t asked for any
information, then the crypto must be broken. How, then, does SSL work? When
you go to a “secure”Web page, you don’t have to provide anything. Does that
mean SSL is a scam? No—a piece of information has indeed been shared: the
root certificate authority’s public key.Whenever you download browser software,
it comes with several certificates already embedded in the installer.These certifi-
cates constitute the bit of information required to makes things “secure.”Yes,
there was an opportunity for a MITM attack when you downloaded the file. If
someone were to muck with the file while it was on the server you downloaded
it from or while it was in transit to your computer, all your SSL traffic could theoretically
SSL is particularly interesting, as it’s one of the best implementations of massmarket
crypto as far as handling keys and such. Of course, it is not without its
problems. If you’re interested in the technical details of how SSL works, check
This law is utilized in Chapter 6.
Malicious Code Cannot Be
100 Percent Protected against
During the last couple of years, we have seen more and more attacks using weaknesses
in operating systems and application code to gain entrance to our systems.
Recently, we’ve seen a number of programs that were quickly modified and redeployed
on the Internet and have resulted in widespread disruption of service and
loss of data.Why is this? It is because we can’t protect 100 percent against malicious
code when it changes as rapidly as it does now.We’ll take a look at some
examples of this in the following section and discuss the anti-virus protection
process as an example.
The Laws of Security • Chapter 2 19
If, like most people, you run a Windows-based operating system (and perhaps
even if you have something else), you run anti-virus software. Perhaps you’re even
diligent about keeping your virus definitions up to date.Are you completely protected
against viruses? Of course not.
Let’s examine what viruses and Trojans are, and how they find their way onto
your computer.Viruses and Trojans are simply programs, each of which has a particular
characteristic.Viruses replicate and require other programs to attach themselves
to.Trojans pretend to have a different function than the one they actually
have. Basically, they are programs that the programmer designed to do something
you generally would not want to have happen if you were aware of their function.
These programs usually get onto your computer through some sort of
trickery.They pretend to be something else, they’re attached to a program you
wanted, or they arrive on media you inserted without knowing it was infected.
They can also be placed by a remote attacker who has already compromised your
How does anti-virus software work? Before program execution can take
place, the anti-virus software will scan the program or media for “bad things,”
which usually consist of viruses,Trojans, and even a few potential hacker tools.
Keep in mind, though, that your anti-virus software vendor is the sole determiner
of what to check for, unless you take the time to develop your own signature
files. Signature files are the meat of most anti-virus programs.They usually consist
of pieces of code or binary data that are (you hope) unique to a particular virus
or Trojan.Therefore, if you get a virus that does not appear in the database, your
anti-virus software cannot help you.
So why is the process so slow? In order to produce a signature file, an antivirus
vendor has to get a copy of the virus or Trojan, analyze it, produce a signature,
update the signature file (and sometimes the anti-virus program too) and
publish the update. Finally, the end user has to retrieve and apply the update.As
you might imagine, there can be some significant delays in getting new virus
information to end users, and until they get it they are vulnerable.
You cannot blindly run any program or download any attachment simply
because you run anti-virus software. Not so long ago, anti-virus software could
usually be relied upon, because viruses propagated so slowly, relying on people to
move them about via diskettes or shared programs. Now, since so many computers
connect to the Internet, that connectivity has become a very attractive carrier
for viruses.They spread via Web pages, e-mail and downloads. Chances are
much greater now that you will see a new virus before your anti-virus software
vendor does. And don’t forget that a custom virus or Trojan may be written
20 Chapter 2 • The Laws of Security
specifically to target you at any time. Under those circumstances, your anti-virus
software will never save you.
Since we have a whole chapter on Trojans and viruses in this book, I will not
go into a lot of detail here about how viruses might be written, or how to trick
people into running Trojans. Rather, by way of demonstration I’d like to tell my
favorite virus story. In April 2000, we saw the introduction of the “I Love You”
virus via the Internet.This was another of the virus worms running in conjunction
with Microsoft’s Outlook e-mail program, and had far greater impact
because it sent itself to all of the e-mail recipients in the address book rather than
just the first fifty, as did the earlier “Melissa” virus. However, despite the efforts of
anti-virus vendors and others to contain the virus, it spread rapidly and spawned
a number of copycat viruses in the short time after it was introduced.Why
couldn’t it be contained more quickly? In the case of a number of my clients, it
was because there were far too many employees who couldn’t resist finding out
who loved them so much! Containment is not always the province of your security
or implementations of protective software.
Trojans and viruses actually could be protected against completely by users modifying
their behavior.They probably wouldn’t get much done with a computer,
though.They’d have to install only software obtained directly from a trusted vendor
(however one would go about determining that.There have been several instances
of commercial products shipping with viruses on the media).They’d probably have
to forgo the use of a network and never exchange information with anyone else.
And, of course, the computer would have to be physically secure.
This law is utilized in Chapter 15.
Any Malicious Code Can Be Completely
Morphed to Bypass Signature Detection
This law is fairly new to our discussions of security, and it has become much
more prevalent over the past year. It is a new truth, since the attackers now have
the ability to change the existing virus/Trojan/remote control application nearly
as soon as it is released in the wild.This leads to the discussion of the new
The Laws of Security • Chapter 2 21
problem—variants. If we continue the discussion with the anti-virus example,
we’ll find that if there is even a slight change in the virus code, there’s a chance
that the anti-virus software won’t be able to spot it any longer.These problems
used to be much less troublesome. Sure, someone had to get infected first, and
their systems were down, but chances were good it wouldn’t be you. By the time
it made its way around to you, your anti-virus vendor had a copy to play with,
and you’d updated your files.
This is no longer the case.The most recent set of viruses propagate much,
much more quickly. Many of them use e-mail to ship themselves between users.
Some even pretend to be you, and use a crude form of social engineering to
trick your friends into running them.This year, we have seen the evidence of this
over and over as the various versions of the Code Red virus were propagated
throughout the world. As you recall, the original version was time and date functional,
with a programmed attack at a U.S. government agency’s Web site. It was
modified successfully by a number of different individuals, and led to a proliferation
of attacks that took some time to overcome.Why was this so successful? The
possibilities for change are endless, and the methods numerous. For instance, you
can modify the original code to create a new code signature, compress the file,
encrypt the file, protect it with a password, or otherwise modify it to help escape
detection.This allows you to move past the virus scanners, firewalls, and IDS systems,
because it is a new signature that is not yet recognized as a threat.
This law is utilized in Chapters 15 and 16.
Want to Check that Firewall?
There are an incredible number of freeware tools available to you for
beginning your checks of vulnerability. Basic tools, of course, include the
basic Transmission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol (TCP/IP) tools
included with the protocol: ping, tracert, pathping, Telnet, and nslookup
Tools & Traps…
22 Chapter 2 • The Laws of Security
Firewalls Cannot Protect
You 100 Percent from Attack
Firewalls can protect a network from certain types of attacks, and they provide
some useful logging. However, much like anti-virus software, firewalls will never
provide 100 percent protection. In fact, they often provide much less than that.
First of all, even if a firewall were 100 percent effective at stopping all attacks
that tried to pass through it, one has to realize that not all avenues of attack go
through the firewall. Malicious employees, physical security, modems, and infected
floppies are all still threats, just to name a few. For purposes of this discussion,
we’ll leave threats that don’t pass through the firewall alone.
Firewalls are devices and/or software designed to selectively separate two or
more networks.They are designed to permit some types of traffic while denying
others.What they permit or deny is usually under the control of the person who
manages the firewall.What is permitted or denied should reflect a written security
policy that exists somewhere within the organization.
As long as something is allowed through, there is potential for attack. For
example, most firewalls permit some sort of Web access, either from the inside
out or to Web servers being protected by the firewall.The simplest of these is
port filtering, which can be done by a router with access lists. A simple and basic
filter for Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP) traffic blocking it at the
outside interface will stop responses from your system to another when an outsider
pings your interface. If you want to see this condition, ping or use tracert
on www.microsoft.com.You’ll time out on the connection. Is Microsoft down?
Hardly—they just block ICMP traffic, among other things, in their defense setup.
can all give you a quick look at vulnerabilities. Along with these, I have
a couple of favorites that allow for quick probes and checks of information
about various IP addresses:
SuperScan, from Foundstone Corporation:
www.foundstone.com/knowledge/free_tools.html (click on
Sam Spade, from SamSpade.org: www.samspade.org.
These two tools, among many other very functional tools, will allow
you to at least see some of the vulnerabilities that may exist where
The Laws of Security • Chapter 2 23
There are a few levels of protection a firewall can give for Web access. Simply
configure the router to allow inside hosts to reach any machine on the Internet
at TCP port 80, and any machine on the Internet to send replies from port 80 to
any inside machine.A more careful firewall may actually understand the
Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP), perhaps only allowing legal HTTP commands.
It may be able to compare the site being visited against a list of notallowed
sites. It might be able to hand over any files being downloaded to a
virus-scanning program to check.
Let’s look at the most paranoid example of an HTTP firewall.You’ll be the
firewall administrator.You’ve configured the firewall to allow only legal HTTP
commands.You’re allowing your users to visit a list of only 20 approved sites.
configured the firewall to allow only retrieving HTML, .gif, and .jpg files.
Can your users sitting behind your firewall still get into trouble? Of course
they can. I’ll be the evil hacker (or perhaps the security-ignorant Webmaster)
trying to get my software through your firewall. How do I get around the fact
that you only allow certain file types? I put up a Web page that tells your users to
right-click on a .jpg to download it and then rename it to evil.exe once it’s on
their hard drive. How do I get past the anti-virus software? Instead of telling your
users to rename the file to .exe, I tell them to rename it to .zip, and unzip it using
the password “hacker.” Your anti-virus software will never be able to check my
password-protected zip file. But that’s okay, right? You won’t let your users get to
my site anyway. No problem. All I have to do is break into one of your approved
sites. However, instead of the usual obvious defacement, I leave it as is, with the
subtle change, I’ll be in.
Won’t the firewall vendors fix these problems? Possibly, but there will be
others.The hackers and firewall vendors are playing a never-ending game of
catch-up. Since the firewall vendors have to wait for the hackers to produce a
new attack before they can fix it, they will always be behind.
On various firewall mailing lists, there have been many philosophical debates
about exactly which parts of a network security perimeter comprise “the firewall,”
but those discussions are not of use for our immediate purposes. For our
purposes, firewalls are the commercial products sold as firewalls, various pieces of
software that claim to do network filtering, filtering routers, and so on. Basically,
our concern is how do we get our information past a firewall?
It turns out that there is plenty of opportunity to get attacks past firewalls.
Ideally, firewalls would implement a security policy perfectly. In reality, someone
24 Chapter 2 • The Laws of Security
has to create the firewall, and humans are far from perfect. One of the major
problems with firewalls is that firewall administrators can’t very easily limit traffic
to exactly the type they would like. For example, the policy may state that Web
access (HTTP) is okay, but RealAudio use is not.The firewall admin should just
shut off the ports for RealAudio, right? Problem is, the folks who wrote
RealAudio are aware that this might happen, so they give the user the option to
pull down RealAudio files via HTTP. In fact, unless you configure it away, most
versions of RealAudio will go through several checks to see how they can access
RealAudio content from a Web site, and it will automatically select HTTP if it
needs to do so.The real problem here is that any protocol can be tunneled over
any other one, as long as timing is not critical (that is, if tunneling won’t make it
run too slowly). RealAudio does buffering to deal with the timing problem.
The designers of various Internet “toys” are keenly aware of which protocols
are typically allowed and which aren’t. Many programs are designed to use HTTP
as either a primary or backup transport to get information through.
There are probably many ways to attack a company with a firewall without
even touching the firewall.These include modems, diskettes, bribery, breaking and
entering, and so on. For the moment, we’ll focus on attacks that must traverse the
One of the first and most obvious ways to traverse a firewall is trickery. E-mail
has become a very popular mechanism for attempting to trick people into doing
stupid things; the “Melissa” and “I Love You” viruses are prime examples. Other
examples may include programs designed to exhibit malicious behavior when
they are run (Trojans) or legitimate programs that have been “infected” or
wrapped in some way (Trojans/viruses). As with most mass-mail campaigns, a low
response rate is enough to be successful.This could be especially damaging if it
were a custom program, so that the anti-virus programs would have no chance to
catch it. For information about what can be done with a virus or Trojan, see
Attacking Exposed Servers
Another way to get past firewalls is to attack exposed servers. Many firewalls
include a demilitarized zone (DMZ) where various Web servers, mail servers and
so on are placed.There is some debate as to whether a classic DMZ is a network
completely outside the firewall (and therefore not protected by the firewall) or
The Laws of Security • Chapter 2 25
whether it’s some in-between network. Currently in most cases,Web servers and
the like are on a third interface of the firewall that protects them from the outside,
allowing the inside not to trust them either and not to let them in.
The problem for firewall admins is that firewalls aren’t all that intelligent.
They can do filtering, they can require authentication, and they can do logging,
but they can’t really tell a good allowed request from a bad allowed request. For
example, I know of no firewall that can tell a legitimate request for a Web page
from an attack on a Common Gateway Interface (CGI) script. Sure, some firewalls
can be programmed to look for certain CGI scripts being attempted (phf,
for example), but if you’ve got a CGI script you want people to use, the firewall
isn’t going to able to tell those people apart from the attacker who has found a
hole in it. Much of the same goes for Simple Mail Transfer Protocol (SMTP), File
Transfer Protocol (FTP), and many other commonly offered services.They are all
attackable. (For information on how to attack services across a network, and for
further examples on how to attack things like CGI scripts, see Chapter 7.)
For the sake of discussion, let’s say that you’ve found a way into a server on
the DMZ.You’ve gained root or administrator access on that box.That doesn’t
get you inside, does it? Not directly, no. Recall that our definition of DMZ
included the concept that DMZ machines can’t get to the inside.Well, that’s usually
not strictly true.Very few organizations are willing to administer their servers
or add new content by going to the console of the machine. For an FTP server,
for example, would they be willing to let the world access the FTP ports, but not
themselves? For administration purposes, most traffic will be initiated from the
inside to the DMZ. Most firewalls have the ability to act as diodes, allowing
traffic to be initiated from one side but not from the other.That type of traffic
would be difficult but not impossible to exploit.The main problem is that you
have to wait for something to happen. If you catch an FTP transfer starting, or
the admin opening an X window back inside, you may have an opportunity.
More likely, you’ll want to look for allowed ports. Many sites include services
that require DMZ machines to be able to initiate contact back to the inside
machine.This includes mail (mail has to be delivered inside), database lookups
(for e-commerce Web sites, for example), and possibly reporting mechanisms
(perhaps syslog).Those are more helpful because you get to determine when the
attempt is made. Let’s look at a few cases:
Suppose you were able to successfully break into the DMZ mail server via
some hole in the mail server daemon. Chances are good that you’ll be able to
talk to an internal mail server from the DMZ mail server. Chances are also good
that the inside mail server is running the same mail daemon you just broke into,
26 Chapter 2 • The Laws of Security
or even something less well protected (after all, it’s an inside machine that isn’t
exposed to the Internet, right?)
Attacking the Firewall Directly
You may find in a few cases that the firewall itself can be compromised.This may
be true for both homegrown firewalls (which require a certain amount of expertise
on the part of the firewall admin) and commercial firewalls (which can sometimes
give a false sense of security, as they need a certain amount of expertise too,
but some people assume that’s not the case). In other cases, a consultant may have
done a good job of setting up the firewall, but now no one is left who knows
how to maintain it. New attacks get published all the time, and if people aren’t
paying attention to the sources that publish this stuff, they won’t know to apply
The method used to attack a firewall is highly dependent on the exact type
of the firewall. Probably the best sources of information on firewall vulnerabilities
are the various security mailing lists. A particularly malicious attacker would do as
much research about a firewall to be attacked as possible, and then lie in wait for
some vulnerability to be posted.
This law is utilized in Chapters 7, 11, 12, 13, 15, and 17.
One of the best ways to get past firewalls is client-side holes. Aside from Web
browser vulnerabilities, other programs with likely holes include AOL Instant
Messenger, MSN Chat, ICQ, IRC clients, and even Telnet and ftp clients.
Exploiting these holes can require some research, patience, and a little luck.You’ll
have to find a user in the organization you want to attack that appears to be running
one of these programs, but many of the chat programs include a mechanism
for finding people, and it’s not uncommon for people to post their ICQ number
on their homepage.You could do a search for victim.com and ICQ.Then you
could wait until business hours when you presume the person will be at work,
and execute your exploit using the ICQ number. If it’s a serious hole, then you
now probably have code running behind the firewall that can do as you like.
The Laws of Security • Chapter 2 27
Any IDS Can Be Evaded
And you ask,“What the heck is an IDS?” IDS stands for intrusion detection system.
At the time of this writing, there are hundreds of vendors providing combined
hardware and software products for intrusion detection, either in combination
with firewall and virus protection products or as freestanding systems. IDSs have a
job that is slightly different from that of firewalls. Firewalls are designed to stop
bad traffic. IDSs are designed to spot bad traffic, but not necessarily to stop it
(though a number of IDSs will cooperate with a firewall to stop the traffic, too).
These IDSs can spot suspicious traffic through a number of mechanisms. One is to
match it against known bad patterns,much like the signature database of an antivirus
program. Another is to check for compliance against written standards and
flag deviations. Still another is to profile normal traffic and flag traffic that varies
from the statistical norm. Because they are constantly monitoring the network,
IDSs help to detect attacks and abnormal conditions both internally and externally
in the network, and provide another level of security from inside attack.
As with firewalls and client-side security methods, IDSs can be evaded and
worked around. One of the reasons that this is true is because we still have users
working hands-on on machines within our network, and as we saw with clientside
security, this makes the system vulnerable. Another cause in the case of firewalls
and IDS systems is that although they are relatively tight when first
installed, the maintenance and care of the systems deteriorates with time, and
vigilance declines.This leads to many misconfigured and improperly maintained
systems, which allows the evasion to occur.
The problem with IDSs for attackers is that they don’t know when one is
present. Unlike firewalls, which are fairly obvious when you hit them, IDSs can
be completely passive and therefore not directly detectable.They can spot suspicious
activity and alert the security admin for the site being attacked, unbeknownst
to the attacker.This may result in greater risk of prosecution for the
attacker. Consider getting an IDS. Free ones are starting to become available and
viable, allowing you to experiment with the various methods of detection that
are offered by the IDS developers. Make sure you audit your logs, because no
system will ever achieve the same level of insight as a well-informed person.
Make absolutely sure that you keep up-to-date on new patches and vulnerabilities.
Subscribe to the various mailing lists and read them. From the attack standpoint,
remember that the attacker can get the same information that you have.
This allows the attacker to find out what the various IDS systems detect and,
28 Chapter 2 • The Laws of Security
more importantly, how the detection occurs.Variations of the attack code can then
be created that are not detectable by the original IDS flags or settings.
In recent months, IDSs have been key in collecting information about new
attacks.This is problematic for attackers, because the more quickly their attack is
known and published, the less well it will work as it’s patched away. In effect, any
new research that an attacker has done will be valuable for a shorter period of
time. I believe that in a few years, an IDS system will be standard equipment for
every organization’s Internet connections, much as firewalls are now.
This law is utilized in Chapter 16.
Algorithms Are Not Secure
This particular “law” is not, strictly speaking, a law. It’s theoretically possible that a
privately, secretly developed cryptographic algorithm could be secure. It turns out,
however, that it just doesn’t happen that way. It takes lots of public review and
lots of really good cryptographers trying to break an algorithm (and failing)
before it can begin to be considered secure.
Bruce Schneier has often stated that anyone can produce a cryptographic
algorithm without being able to break it. Programmers and writers know this as
well. Programmers cannot effectively beta-test their own software, just as writers
cannot effectively proofread their own writing. Put another way, to produce a
secure algorithm, a cryptographer must know all possible attacks and be able to
recognize when they apply to his or her algorithm.This includes currently
known attacks as well as those that may be made public in the future. Clearly no
cryptographer can predict the future, but some of them have the ability to produce
algorithms that are resistant to new things because they are able to anticipate
or guess some possible future attacks.
This has been demonstrated many times in the past. A cryptographer, or
someone who thinks he or she is one, produces a new algorithm. It looks fine to
this person, who can’t see any problem.The “cryptographer” may do one of several
things: use it privately, publish the details, or produce a commercial product.
The Laws of Security • Chapter 2 29
With very few exceptions, if it’s published, it gets broken, and often quickly.What
about the other two scenarios? If the algorithm isn’t secure when it’s published, it
isn’t secure at any time.What does that do to the author’s private security or to
the security of his customers?
Why do almost all new algorithms fail? One answer is that good crypto is
hard. Another is the lack of adequate review. For all the decent cryptographers
who can break someone else’s algorithm, there are many more people who
would like to try writing one. Crypto authors need lots of practice to learn to
write good crypto.This means they need to have their new algorithms broken
over and over again, so they can learn from the mistakes. If they can’t find people
to break their crypto, the process gets harder. Even worse, some authors may take
the fact that no one broke their algorithm (probably due to lack of time or
interest) to mean that it must be secure!
For an example of this future thinking, let’s look at DES. In 1990, Eli Biham
and Adi Shamir, two world-famous cryptographers, “discovered” what they called
differential cryptanalysis.This was some time after DES had been produced and
made standard. Naturally, they tried their new technique on DES.They were able
to make an improvement over a simple brute-force attack, but there was no devastating
reduction in the amount of time it took to crack DES. It turns out that
the structure of the s-boxes in DES was nearly ideal for defending against differential
cryptanalysis. It seems that someone who worked on the DES design knew
of, or had suspicions about, differential cryptanalysis.
Very few cryptographers are able to produce algorithms of this quality.They
are also the ones who usually are able to break the good algorithms. I’ve heard
that a few cryptographers advocate breaking other people’s algorithms as a way to
learn how to write good ones.These world-class cryptographers produce algorithms
that get broken, so they put their work out into the cryptographic world
for peer review. Even then, it often takes time for the algorithms to get the
proper review. Some new algorithms use innovative methods to perform their
work.Those types may require innovative attack techniques, which may take time
to develop. In addition, most of these cryptographers are in high demand and are
quite busy, so they don’t have time to review every algorithm that gets published.
In some cases, an algorithm would have to appear to be becoming popular in
order to justify the time spent looking at it. All of these steps take time—sometimes
years.Therefore, even the best cryptographers will sometimes recommend
that you not trust their own new algorithms until they’ve been around for a long
time. Even the world’s best cryptographers produce breakable crypto from time
30 Chapter 2 • The Laws of Security
The U.S. government has now decided to replace DES with a new standard
cryptographic algorithm.This new one is to be called Advanced Encryption
Standard (AES), and the NIST (National Institute of Standards and Technology)
has selected Rijndael as the proposed AES algorithm. Most of the world’s top
cryptographers submitted work for consideration during a several-day conference.
A few of the algorithms were broken during the conference by the other
We can’t teach you how to break real crypto. Chances are, no single book
could.That’s okay, though.We’ve still got some crypto fun for you.There are lots
of people out there who think they are good cryptographers and are willing to
sell products based on that belief. In other cases, developers may realize that they
can’t use any real cryptography because of the lack of a separate key, so they may
opt for something simple to make it less obvious what they are doing. In those
cases, the crypto will be much easier to break. (We’ll show you how to do that in
Again, the point of this law is not to perform an action based on it, but rather
to develop suspicion.You should use this law to evaluate the quality of a product
that contains crypto.The obvious solution here is to use well-established crypto
algorithms.This includes checking as much as possible that the algorithms are used
intelligently. For example, what good does 3DES do you if you’re using only a
seven-character password? Most passwords that people choose are only worth a
few bits of randomness per letter. Seven characters, then, is much less than 56 bits.
This law is utilized in Chapter 6.
If a Key Is Not Required, You Do Not
Have Encryption—You Have Encoding
This one is universal—no exceptions. Just be certain that you know whether or
not there is a key and how well it’s managed. As Scott Culp mentions in his law
#7,“Encrypted data is only as secure as the decryption key.”
The key in encryption is used to provide variance when everyone is using
the same small set of algorithms. Creating good crypto algorithms is hard, which
The Laws of Security • Chapter 2 31
is why only a handful of them are used for many different things. New crypto
algorithms aren’t often needed, as the ones we have now can be used in a
number of different ways (message signing, block encrypting, and so on). If the
best-known (and foreseeable) attack on an algorithm is brute force, and brute
force will take sufficiently long, there is not much reason to change. New algorithms
should be suspect, as we mentioned previously.
In the early history of cryptography, most schemes depended on the communicating
parties using the same system to scramble their messages to each other.
There was usually no key or pass-phrase of any sort.The two parties would agree
on a scheme, such as moving each letter up the alphabet by three letters, and they
would send their messages.
Later, more complicated systems were put into use that depended on a word
or phrase to set the mechanism to begin with, and then the message would be
run through.This allowed for the system to be known about and used by multiple
parties, and they could still have some degree of security if they all used different
These two types highlight the conceptual difference between what encoding
and encrypting are. Encoding uses no key, and if the parties involved want their
encoded communications to be secret, then their encoding scheme must be
secret. Encrypting uses a key (or keys) of some sort that both parties must know.
The algorithm can be known, but if an attacker doesn’t have the keys, that
Of course, the problem is that encoding schemes can rarely be kept secret.
Everyone will get a copy of the algorithm. If there were no key, everyone who
had a copy of the program would be able to decrypt anything encrypted with it.
That wouldn’t bode well for mass-market crypto products. A key enables the
known good algorithms to be used in many places. So what do you do when
you’re faced with a product that says it uses Triple-DES encryption with no
remembering of passwords required? Run away! DES and variants (like 3DES)
depend on the secrecy of the key for their strength. If the key is known, the
secrets can obviously be decrypted.Where is the product getting a key to work
with if not from you? Off the hard drive, somewhere.
Is this better than if it just used a bad algorithm? This is probably slightly
better if the files are to leave the machine, perhaps across a network. If they are
intercepted there, they may still be safe. However, if the threat model includes
people who have access to the machine itself it’s pretty useless, since they can get
the key as well. Cryptographers have become very good at determining what
encoding scheme is being used and then decoding the messages. If you’re talking
32 Chapter 2 • The Laws of Security
about an encoding scheme that is embedded in some sort of mass-market
product, forget the possibility of keeping it secret. Attackers will have all the
opportunity they need to determine what the encoding scheme is.
If you run across a product that doesn’t appear to require the exchange of keys of
some sort and claims to have encrypted communications, think very hard about
what you have. Ask the vendor a lot of questions of about exactly how it works.
Think back to our earlier discussion about exchanging keys securely. If your
vendor glosses over the key exchange portion of a product, and can’t explain in
painstaking detail how exactly the key exchange problem was solved, then you
probably have an insecure product. In most cases, you should expect to have to
program keys manually on the various communication endpoints.
This law is utilized in Chapters 6 and 10.
Passwords Cannot Be Securely Stored
on the Client Unless There Is Another
Password to Protect Them
This statement about passwords specifically refers to programs that store some form
of the password on the client machine in a client-server relationship. Remember
that the client is always under the complete control of the person sitting in front of
it.Therefore, there is generally no such thing as secure storage on client machines.
What usually differentiates a server is that the user/attacker is forced to interact
with it across a network, via what should be a limited interface.The one possible
exception to all client storage being attackable is if encryption is used.This law is
really a specific case of the previous one:“If a key isn’t required, then you don’t
have encryption—you have encoding.” Clearly, this applies to passwords just as it
would to any other sort of information. It’s mentioned as a separate case because
passwords are often of particular interest in security applications. Every time an
application asks you for a password, you should think to yourself,“How is it
stored?” Some programs don’t store the password after it’s been used because they
don’t need it any longer—at least not until next time. For example, many Telnet
and ftp clients don’t remember passwords at all; they just pass them straight to the
The Laws of Security • Chapter 2 33
server. Other programs will offer to “remember” passwords for you.They may give
you an icon to click on and not have to type the password.
How securely do these programs store your password? It turns out that in most
cases, they can’t store your password securely.As covered in the previous law, since
they have no key to encrypt with, all they can do is encode. It may be a very complicated
encoding, but it’s encoding nonetheless, because the program has to be able
to decode the password to use it. If the program can do it, so can someone else.
This one is also universal, though there can be apparent exceptions. For
example,Windows will offer to save dial-up passwords.You click the icon and it
logs into your ISP for you.Therefore, the password is encoded on the hard drive
somewhere and it’s fully decodable, right? Not necessarily.Microsoft has designed
the storage of this password around the Windows login. If you have such a saved
password, try clicking Cancel instead of typing your login password the next
time you boot Windows.You’ll find that your saved dial-up password isn’t available,
because Windows uses the login password to unlock the dial-up password.
All of this is stored in a .pwl file in your Windows directory.
Occasionally, for a variety of reasons, a software application will want to store
some amount of information on a client machine. For Web browsers, this
includes cookies and, sometimes, passwords. (The latest versions of Internet
Explorer will offer to remember your names and passwords.). For programs
intended to access servers with an authentication component, such as Telnet
clients and mail readers, this is often a password.What’s the purpose of storing
your password? So that you don’t have to type it every time.
Obviously, this feature isn’t really a good idea. If you’ve got an icon on your
machine that you can simply click to access a server, and it automatically supplies
your username and password, then anyone who walks up can do the same. Can
they do anything worse than this? As we’ll see, the answer is yes.
Let’s take the example of an e-mail client that is helpfully remembering your
password for you.You make the mistake of leaving me alone in your office for a
moment, with your computer.What can I do? Clearly, I can read your mail easily,
but I’ll want to arrange it so I can have permanent access to it, not just the one
chance. Since most mail passwords pass in the clear (and let’s assume that in this
case that’s true), if I had a packet capture program I could load onto your computer
quickly, or if I had my laptop ready to go, I could grab your password off
the wire.This is a bit more practical than the typical monitoring attack, since I
now have a way to make your computer send your password at will.
However, I may not have time for such elaborate preparations. I may only
have time to slip a diskette out of my shirt and copy a file. Perhaps I might send
34 Chapter 2 • The Laws of Security
the file across your network link instead, if I’m confident I won’t show up in a
log somewhere and be noticed. Of course, I’d have to have an idea what file(s) I
was after.This would require some preparation or research. I’d have to know what
mail program you typically use. But if I’m in your office, chances are good that I
would have had an opportunity to exchange mail with you at some point, and
every e-mail you send to me tells me in the message headers what e-mail program
What’s in this file I steal? Your stored password, of course. Some programs will
simply store the password in the clear, enabling me to read it directly.That sounds
bad, but as we’ll see, programs that do that are simply being honest. In this instance,
you should try to turn off any features that allow for local password storage if possible.
Try to encourage vendors not to put in these sorts of “features.”
Let’s assume for a moment that’s not the case. I look at the file and I don’t see
anything that looks like a password.What do I do? I get a copy of the same program,
use your file, and click Connect. Bingo, I’ve got (your) mail. If I’m still
curious, in addition to being able to get your mail I can now set up the packet
capture and find your password at my leisure.
It gets worse yet. For expediency’s sake, maybe there’s a reason I don’t want to
(or can’t) just hit Connect and watch the password fly by. Perhaps I can’t reach
your mail server at the moment, because it’s on a private network. And perhaps
you were using a protocol that doesn’t send the password in the clear after all.
Can I still do anything with your file I’ve stolen? Of course.
Consider this: without any assistance, your mail program knows how to
decode the password and send it (or some form of it). How does it do that?
Obviously it knows something you don’t, at least not yet. It either knows the
algorithm to reverse the encoding, which is the same for every copy of that program,
or it knows the secret key to decrypt the password, which must be stored
on your computer.
In either case, if I’ve been careful about stealing the right files, I’ve got what I
need to figure out your password without ever trying to use it. If it’s a simple
decode, I can figure out the algorithm by doing some experimentation and
trying to guess the algorithm, or I can disassemble the portion of the program
that does that and figure it out that way. It may take some time, but if I’m persistent,
I have everything I need to do so.Then I can share it with the world so
everyone else can do it easily.
If the program uses real encryption, it’s still not safe if I’ve stolen the right
file(s). Somewhere that program must have also stored the decryption key; if it
The Laws of Security • Chapter 2 35
didn’t it couldn’t decode your password, and clearly it can. I just have to make
sure I steal the decryption key as well.
Couldn’t the program require the legitimate user to remember the decryption
key? Sure, but then why store the client password in the first place? The point
was to keep the user from having to type in a password all the time.
This law is utilized in Chapter 6.
In Order for a System to Begin to Be
Considered Secure, It Must Undergo
an Independent Security Audit
Writers know that they can’t proofread their own work. Programmers ought to
know that they can’t bug-test their own programs. Most software companies
Vigilance is Required Always!
Much discussion has been raised recently about the number of attacks
that occur and the rapid deployment and proliferation of malicious
codes and attacks. Fortunately, most of the attacks are developed to
attack vulnerabilities in operating system and application code that have
been known for some time. As we saw this year, many of the Code Red
attacks and the variants that developed from them were attacking longknown
vulnerabilities in the targeted products. The sad thing (and this
should be embarrassing both professionally and personally) was the
obvious number of network administrators and technicians who had
failed to follow the availability of fixes for these systems and keep them
patched and up-to-date. No amount of teaching, and no amount of
technical reference materials (such as this book) can protect your systems
if you don’t stay vigilant and on top of the repairs and fixes that
Notes from the Underground…
36 Chapter 2 • The Laws of Security
realize this, and they employ software testers.These software testers look for bugs
in the programs that keep them from performing their stated functions.This is
called functional testing.
Functional testing is vastly different from security testing, although on the
surface, they sound similar.They’re both looking for bugs, right? Yes and no.
Security testing (which ought to be a large superset of functionality testing)
requires much more in-depth analysis of a program, usually including an examination
of the source code. Functionality testing is done to ensure that a large percentage
of the users will be able to use the product without complaining.
Defending against the average user accidentally stumbling across a problem is
much easier than trying to keep a knowledgeable hacker from breaking a program
any way he can.
Even without fully discussing what a security audit is, it should be becoming
obvious why it’s needed. How many commercial products undergo a security
review? Almost none. Usually the only ones that have even a cursory security
review are security products. Even then, it often becomes apparent later on that
they didn’t get a proper review.
Notice that this law contains the word “begin.” A security audit is only one
step in the process of producing secure systems.You only have to read the
archives of any vulnerability reporting list to realize that software packages are full
of holes. Not only that, but we see the same mistakes made over and over again
by various software vendors. Clearly, those represent a category in which not
even the most minimal amount of auditing was done.
Probably one of the most interesting examples of how auditing has produced
a more secure software package is OpenBSD.Originally a branch-off from the
NetBSD project, OpenBSD decided to emphasize security as its focus.The
OpenBSD team spent a couple of years auditing the source code for bugs and
fixing them.They fixed any bugs they found, whether they appeared to be security
related or not.When they found a common bug, they would go back and
search all the source code to see whether that type of error had been made anywhere
The end result is that OpenBSD is widely considered one of the most secure
operating systems there is. Frequently, when a new bug is found in NetBSD or
FreeBSD (another BSD variant), OpenBSD is found to be not vulnerable.
Sometimes the reason it’s not vulnerable is that the problem was fixed (by accident)
during the normal process of killing all bugs. In other cases, it was recognized that
there was a hole, and it was fixed. In those cases, NetBSD and FreeBSD (if they
The Laws of Security • Chapter 2 37
have the same piece of code) were vulnerable because someone didn’t check the
OpenBSD database for new fixes (all the OpenBSD fixes are made public).
This law is utilized in Chapters 4, 5, 8, and 9.
Obscurity Does Not Work
Basically,“security through obscurity” (known as STO) is the idea that something is
secure simply because it isn’t obvious, advertised, or interesting. A good example is a
new Web server. Suppose you’re in the process of making a new Web server available
to the Internet.You may think that because you haven’t registered a Domain
Name System (DNS) name yet, and because no links exist to the Web server, you
can put off securing the machine until you’re ready to go live.
The problem is, port scans have become a permanent fixture on the Internet.
Depending on your luck, it will probably be only a matter of days or even hours
before your Web server is discovered.Why are these port scans permitted to
occur? They aren’t illegal in most places, and most ISPs won’t do anything when
you report that you’re being portscanned.
What can happen if you get portscanned? The vast majority of systems and
software packages are insecure out of the box. In other words, if you attach a
system to the Internet, you can be broken into relatively easily unless you actively
take steps to make it more secure.Most attackers who are port scanning are
looking for particular vulnerabilities. If you happen to have the particular vulnerability
they are looking for, they have an exploit program that will compromise
your Web server in seconds. If you’re lucky, you’ll notice it. If not, you could continue
to “secure” the host, only to find out later that the attacker left a backdoor
that you couldn’t block, because you’d already been compromised.
Worse still, in the last year a number of worms have become permanent fixtures
on the Internet.These worms are constantly scanning for new victims, such
as a fresh, unsecured Web server. Even when the worms are in their quietest
period, any host on the Internet will get a couple of probes per day.When the
worms are busiest, every host on the Internet gets probes every few minutes,
38 Chapter 2 • The Laws of Security
which is about how long an unpatched Web server has to live. Never assume it’s
safe to leave a hole or to get sloppy simply because you think no one will find it.
The minute a new hole is discovered that reveals program code, for example,
you’re exposed. An attacker doesn’t have to do a lot of research ahead of time and
wait patiently.Often the holes in programs are publicized very quickly, and lead
to the vulnerability being attacked on vulnerable systems.
Let me clarify a few points about STO: Keeping things obscure isn’t necessarily
bad.You don’t want to give away any more information than you need to.
You can take advantage of obscurity; just don’t rely on it. Also, carefully consider
whether you might have a better server in the long run by making source code
available so that people can review it and make their own patches as needed. Be
prepared, though, to have a round or two of holes before it becomes secure.
How obscure is obscure enough? One problem with the concept of STO is
that there is no agreement about what constitutes obscurity and what can be
treated like a bona fide secret. For example, whether your password is a secret or
is simply “obscured” probably depends on how you handle it. If you’ve got it
written down on a piece of paper under your keyboard and you’re hoping no
one will find it, I’d call that STO. (By the way, that’s the first place I’d look. At
one company where I worked, we used steel cables with padlocks to lock computers
down to the desks. I’d often be called upon to move a computer, and the
user would have neglected to provide the key as requested. I’d check for the key
in this order: pencil holder, under the keyboard, top drawer. I had about a 50 percent
success rate for finding the key.)
It comes down to a judgment call. My personal philosophy is that all security
is STO. It doesn’t matter whether you’re talking about a house key under the mat
or a 128-bit crypto key.The question is, does the attacker know what he needs,
or can he discover it? One of the reasons you should be reading this book is to
learn exactly what can be discovered. Many systems and sites have long survived
in obscurity, reinforcing their belief that there is no reason to target them.We’ll
have to see whether it’s simply a matter of time before they are compromised.
This law is utilized in Chapters 4 and 5.
The Laws of Security • Chapter 2 39
In this chapter, we have tried to provide you with an initial look at the basic laws
of security that we work with on a regular basis.As we progress through the
book, we’ll expand on the discussion of the laws that we have begun here.We’ve
looked at a number of different topic areas to introduce our concepts and our list
of the laws of security.These have included initial glances at some concepts that
may be new to you, and that should inspire a fresh look at some of the areas of
vulnerability as we begin to protect our networks.We’ve looked at physical control
issues, encryption and the exchange of encryption keys.We’ve also begun to
look at firewalls, virus detection programs, and intrusion detection systems (IDSs),
as well as modification of code to bypass firewalls, viruses, and IDSs, cryptography,
auditing, and security through obscurity. As you have seen, not all of the
laws are absolutes, but rather an area of work that we use to try to define the
needs for security, the vulnerabilities, and security problems that should be
observed and repaired as we can. All of these areas are in need of constant evaluation
and work as we continue to try to secure our systems against attack.
Solutions Fast Track
Knowing the Laws of Security
Review the laws.
Use the laws to make your system more secure.
Client-Side Security Doesn’t Work
Client-side security is security enforced solely on the client.
The user always has the opportunity to break the security, because he or
she is in control of the machine.
Client-side security will not provide security if time and resources are
available to the attacker.
40 Chapter 2 • The Laws of Security
You Cannot Securely Exchange Encryption
Keys without a Shared Piece of Information
Shared information is used to validate machines prior to session
You can exchange shared private keys or use Secure Sockets Layer (SSL)
through your browser.
Key exchanges are vulnerable to man-in-the-middle (MITM) attacks.
Malicious Code Cannot Be
100 Percent Protected against
Software products are not perfect.
Virus and Trojan detection software relies on signature files.
Minor changes in the code signature can produce a non-detectable
variation (until the next signature file is released).
Any Malicious Code Can Be Completely
Morphed to Bypass Signature Detection
Attackers can change the identity or signature of a file quickly.
Attackers can use compression, encryption, and passwords to change the
look of code.
You can’t protect against every possible modification.
Firewalls Cannot Protect You 100 Percent from Attack
Firewalls can be software or hardware, or both.
The primary function of a firewall is to filter incoming and outgoing
Successful attacks are possible as a result of improper rules, policies, and
The Laws of Security • Chapter 2 41
Any IDS Can Be Evaded
Intrusion detection systems (IDSs) are often passive designs.
It is difficult for an attacker to detect the presence of IDS systems when
An IDS is subject to improper configuration and lack of maintenance.
These conditions may provide opportunity for attack.
Secret Cryptographic Algorithms Are Not Secure
Crypto is hard.
Most crypto doesn’t get reviewed and tested enough prior to launch.
Common algorithms are in use in multiple areas.They are difficult, but
not impossible, to attack.
If a Key Is Not Required,You Do Not
Have Encryption—You Have Encoding
This law is universal; there are no exceptions.
Encryption is used to protect the encoding. If no key is present, you
Keys must be kept secret, or no security is present.
Passwords Cannot Be Securely Stored on the Client
Unless There Is Another Password to Protect Them
It is easy to detect password information stored on client machines.
If a password is unencrypted or unwrapped when it is stored, it is not
Password security on client machines requires a second mechanism to
42 Chapter 2 • The Laws of Security
In Order for a System to Begin to Be
Considered Secure, It Must Undergo
an Independent Security Audit
Auditing is the start of a good security systems analysis.
Security systems are often not reviewed properly or completely, leading
Outside checking is critical to defense; lack of it is an invitation to
Security through Obscurity Does Not Work
Hiding it doesn’t secure it.
Proactive protection is needed.
The use of obscurity alone invites compromise.
Q: How much effort should I spend trying to apply these laws to a particular
system that I’m interested in reviewing?
A: That depends on what your reason for review is. If you’re doing so for purposes
of determining how secure a system is so that you can feel comfortable
using it yourself, then you need to weigh your time against your threat
model. If you’re expecting to use the package, it’s directly reachable by the
Internet at large, and it’s widely available, you should probably spend a lot of
time checking it. If it will be used in some sort of back-end system, if it’s
custom designed, or if the system it’s on is protected in some other way, you
may want to spend more time elsewhere.
Frequently Asked Questions
The following Frequently Asked Questions, answered by the authors of this book,
are designed to both measure your understanding of the concepts presented in
this chapter and to assist you with real-life implementation of these concepts. To
have your questions about this chapter answered by the author, browse to
www.syngress.com/solutions and click on the “Ask the Author” form.
The Laws of Security • Chapter 2 43
Similarly, if you’re performing some sort of penetration test, you will have
to weigh your chances of success using one particular avenue of attack versus
another. It may be appropriate to visit each system that you can attack in
turn, and return to those that look more promising. Most attackers would
favor a system they could replicate in their own lab, returning to the actual
target later with a working exploit.
Q: How secure am I likely to be after reviewing a system myself?
A: This depends partially on how much effort you expend. In addition, you have
to assume that you didn’t find all the holes. However, if you spend a reasonable
amount of time, you’ve probably spotted the low-hanging fruit—the easy
holes.This puts you ahead of the game.The script kiddies will be looking for
the easy holes. Even if you become the target of a talented attacker, the
attacker may try the easy holes, so you should have some way of burglaralarming
them. Since you’re likely to find something when you look, and
you’ll probably publish your findings, everyone will know about the holes.
Keep in mind that you’re protected against the ones you know about, but not
against the ones you don’t know about. One way to help guard against this is
to alarm the known holes when you fix them.This can be more of a challenge
with closed-source software.
Q: When I find a hole, what should I do about it?
A: This is covered in depth in Chapter 18.There are choices to make about
whether to publish it at all, how much notice to give a vendor if applicable,
and whether to release exploit code if applicable.
Q: How do I go from being able to tell that a problem is there to being able to
A: Many of the chapters in this book cover specific types of holes. For holes that
aren’t covered here, the level of difficulty will vary widely. Some holes, such as
finding a hard-coded password in an application, are self-explanatory. Others
may require extensive use of decompiling and cryptanalysis. Even if you’re
very good, there will always be some technique that is out of your area of
expertise.You’ll have to decide whether you want to develop that skill or
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